At 6 a.m. on 1 October 1918, Feisal's forces entered Damascus. All day and night they flowed into the Omayade capital and started looting and killing, particularly Turkish soldiers who were wounded and sick. British units remained outside the city. The new Arab administration proved unable to keep order. One particularly gruesome incident was the looting of the main Turkish hospital. It contained between 600 to 800 wounded. Many of them died. The Turks had no cover for the sick. Few of the men had blankets; they had no medical organisation. There were no drugs, bandages, or food fit for sick men; no sanitation. Very little assistance could be obtained from the local Arab authorities in Damascus. They were indifferent to human suffering. However, the wounded Turks left in Damascus suffered not just because of Arab logistical problems, but also because the political need to exclude the British units from Damascus left the sick and wounded Turks bereft of care. The British re-occupied the Turkish military hospitals after four days' Arab control as the Turkish wounded were receiving no care. They then set about cutting the death rate from 70 to 15 a day. The patterns of military administration in Damascus were supposed to follow international practice as prescribed in the Fourth Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land signed at the Hague in the Netherlands on 18 October 1907 and entered into force on 26 January 1910, to which both Britain and the Ottoman Empire were parties. The British clearly disregarded the general rules on the occupied enemy territories as defined by this convention. It was essential to obey the main rules of military occupation. Therefore the neglect of the Turkish hospitals in Damascus by British forces, was, to say the least, unlawful. The poor conditions for the wounded Turks were a direct result of the British army being instructed to promote an Arab administration in Damascus. The French looked upon this British connivance with indignation. Paris accused London of hiding behind the façade of Arab nationalism to undermine French influence in Syria. During the war Britain had already in the Sykes-Picot Agreement recognised French interest in Syria. In terms of international politics it must have been that the Turkish sick and wounded were marginal to the central objective of giving the impression that Feisal's Arabs were in charge. Turks suffered as a result of British realpolitik.

In August 1937 indiscriminate attacks upon merchant ships in the Mediterranean by unidentified submarines had begun. Most alarming for Turkey, some of these submarines were operating inside the Straits. On 10-14 September 1937 an international conference, on the initiative of Britain and France, was organised at Nyon for ending the existing state of insecurity in the Mediterranean. On 14 September, it was agreed that pirate submarines should be counter-attacked and destroyed. Turkey promised to provide bases for the patrolling vessels. Turks were also responsible for patrols in the Dardanelles. The outcome of the conference was welcomed by Atatürk, whereas İnönü's reaction was mixed. i.e. one of criticism and praise. Turkey, on Atatürk's instructions, co-operated fully in the international patrol set up by the conference to suppress pirate submarines. But İnönü showed caution over the agreement, apprehending about a war with Italy. The measures agreed upon at Nyon proved effective. Submarine piracy quickly disappeared. By its signature of the Nyon Agreement, Turkey stressed its interest in preserving the status quo and the principle of collective security. It was therefore drawn towards closer co-operation with Britain and France. The trend towards rapprochement was reciprocal, since these two countries also needed Turkey's co-operation.

Although most frequent mention must be made of the political relations, the special emphasis in the article lays on the economic cooperation between Turkey and Germany. For commercial and financial factors played a key role in shaping the Turkish-German relations in the second half of the 1930s. Turkey came to view the dominant German grip over its economy with much anxiety and looked to other powers to assist it in breaking the Reichsmark shackle. In the political field, the dynamics of Turkish-German relations often led Germany to seek a formal relationship which Turkey, for reasons of its own, did not grant. Throughout the study Ankara's attitude vis-a-vis Berlin evaluated in terms of its position within wider Turkish diplomatic strategy.

French occupation of Cilicia following the First World War was mainly strategic and economic in character. The French committed all the errors of wicked military occupation. The Turkish Nationalists, on their part, fiercely resisted the foreign occupation of the region. By May 1920 the military weakness of the French had compelled them to surrender Maraş, Urfa and Pozantı. Defeat on battleground forced the French to conclude an armistice with the Turks. This act was considered as a serious blow to the prestige of the Allies and as the first big step towards the recognition of the Turkish Nationalists as a government controlling Anatolia. Resumption of the armed operations by the Turks produced considerable alarm at Paris. The French eventually concluded that the consts of controlling Cilicia outweighed dthe benefits of this venture and decided to approach Ankara for settlement. France was impressed by Turkish victory over the Greeks in the Sakarya battle in August-September 1921. Negotiations were therefore entered into with the Turks and an agreement was signed on 20 October 1921. This agreement was the greatest Turkish diplomatic victory so far. It had very significant bearings. Ankara Agreement's terms were criticised by Britain, French colonial party and Syrian nationalists.

The Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 marked the beginning of a definite closeness in Turco-British relations, which were to undergo a long process of development. During the Ethiopian crisis, Turkey followed Britain in defence of the League of Nations Covenant. Firm co-operation between Turkey and Britain during the Montreux Straits Conference of 1936 further accelerated the pace of rapprochement. With King Edward VIII's visit to Turkey, just after the Montreux settlement, the mutual friendship took a step forward. At the Nyon Conference of 1937, Turkey supported Britain in its defence of international shipping against attacks by pirate submarines in the Mediterranean. Nyon drew the Turks and British closer together. In 1938 Britain granted a credit of sixteen million pounds to Turkey which strengthened the growing friendship between Ankara and London and aimed at reducing the necessity of Turkish economy depending on Germany. Germany's occupation of Czechoslovakia and Italy's annexation of Albania in the spring of 1939 soon led Turkey and Britain to sign a mutual assistance agreement. This accord combined Turkish and British energies for the protection of peace and paved the way for the conclusion of the Turco-Anglo-French Triple Alliance Treaty in the autumn of the same year.

The basic foreign policy of Turkey under Atatürk was one of friendship with all its neighbours and non-involvement in Great Power politics. Atatürk was essentially a realist. He repudiated adventurism and expansionism. What Turkey wanted was to accomplish its internal reconstruction in peace. The major stance of Atatürk's diplomacy was not only pacific, but was also clearly respectful of law. Since the Republic of Turkey came into existence, the main background of Turkish foreign policy had been friendship with the Soviets. Good relations with Russia guaranteed Turkey's continued security on its northeastern frontier and in the Black Sea. Following the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and basically on account of this fact a Turco-British rapprochement started to take shape since 1935. Close co-operation between Turkey and Britain during the Montreux Straits Conference further accelerated the pace. Another aspect of Turkish foreign policy was the Balkan Entente of 1934 to guard against aggression in the region. Turkey's part in the Saadabad Pact of 1937 had also been active and enthusiastic. Regaining of Turkish sovereignty over the Straits at the Montreux Conference and winning back of the district of Hatay were among the most important successes of the Turkish diplomacy under Atatürk's auspices.

Following his seizure of power in 1922, Mussolini began to pursue the policy of 'mare nostrum' of the ancient Romans. He had an eye on the Anatolian lands bordering the Mediterranean. Local symbol of the Italian menace was the Dodecanese Islands which were started to be fortified in 1934. Mussolini's speech of that year showed that Italy did not renounce its earlier designs on Turkish territory. Atatürk did not take Mussolini's claims seriously, but the danger Italy represented could not be ignored. During the Ethiopian crisis, Turkey supported the League of Nations' sanctions against Italy and advocated the principle of collective security. Facing Italian expansionism, Turkey requested the holding of an international conference in Montreux and succeeded to obtain the right of bringing back the Straits to full Turkish sovereignty. Turkey's distrust of Italy deepened in 1937 and 1938. Ankara disliked the policy of Rome-Berlin axis. It did not acquit Italy of designs in the eastern Mediterranean. Italian occupation of Albania in 1939 soon led to Turkey's signing of mutual assistance agreements with Britain and France. Italy sharply denounced the Turco-Anglo-French rapprochement. For Turkey, as an ally in the eastern Mediterranean, had the strength to tip the balance against Italy.