Taner Akçam peremptorily writes that the title of his book "A Shameful Act" is a quotation from a speech on Armenian genocide delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk at a session of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on 24 April 1920 (pp.12-13, 335-336 and 348).The choice of title no doubt reflects the author's desire to give indication of the contents of his work. Yet the above words were not actually used by the founder and the first president of the Turkish republic with regard to the Armenian relocations of 1915, but pronounced pertaining to the claims of the Allied powers on these events.This is a deliberately intriguing and provocative venture, whose essential thesis is revealed in its subtitle.

In view of growing threat of the Axis powers, by the beginning of 1939 a security agreement with the Soviet Union came high on the list of Turkish priorities. Turkey would also co-operate with Britain in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Ankara proposed a triangular Turco-Anglo-Soviet relationship. Turkey sought to search for the illusive Soviet connection to parallel its signing of mutual assistance agreement with Britain on 12 May 1939. But the Germano-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 23 August 1939 upset the entire international balance and put Turkey into a delicate position. Nonetheless Ankara still considered that arriving at an accord with Moscow would not be incompatible with its engagements towards the West. Saracoğlu's mission to Muscow in the autumn of 1939 failed because of Russia's attempts to unilaterally amend the Montreux Straits Convention and to draw Turkey away from the West. During Saracoğlu-Molotov talks, Kremlin endeavoured to obtain a foothold at the Straits in order at once prevent others from commanding the warm water approach to its Black Sea ports and to place itself in a position to exercise a hand in Mediterranean affairs. Relations between Turkey and Russia thus entered into a new period of mutual distrust and tension.

In August 1937 indiscriminate attacks upon merchant ships in the Mediterranean by unidentified submarines had begun. Most alarming for Turkey, some of these submarines were operating inside the Straits. On 10-14 September 1937 an international conference, on the initiative of Britain and France, was organised at Nyon for ending the existing state of insecurity in the Mediterranean. On 14 September, it was agreed that pirate submarines should be counter-attacked and destroyed. Turkey promised to provide bases for the patrolling vessels. Turks were also responsible for patrols in the Dardanelles. The outcome of the conference was welcomed by Atatürk, whereas İnönü's reaction was mixed. i.e. one of criticism and praise. Turkey, on Atatürk's instructions, co-operated fully in the international patrol set up by the conference to suppress pirate submarines. But İnönü showed caution over the agreement, apprehending about a war with Italy. The measures agreed upon at Nyon proved effective. Submarine piracy quickly disappeared. By its signature of the Nyon Agreement, Turkey stressed its interest in preserving the status quo and the principle of collective security. It was therefore drawn towards closer co-operation with Britain and France. The trend towards rapprochement was reciprocal, since these two countries also needed Turkey's co-operation.

Although most frequent mention must be made of the political relations, the special emphasis in the article lays on the economic cooperation between Turkey and Germany. For commercial and financial factors played a key role in shaping the Turkish-German relations in the second half of the 1930s. Turkey came to view the dominant German grip over its economy with much anxiety and looked to other powers to assist it in breaking the Reichsmark shackle. In the political field, the dynamics of Turkish-German relations often led Germany to seek a formal relationship which Turkey, for reasons of its own, did not grant. Throughout the study Ankara's attitude vis-a-vis Berlin evaluated in terms of its position within wider Turkish diplomatic strategy.

The basic foreign policy of Turkey under Atatürk was one of friendship with all its neighbours and non-involvement in Great Power politics. Atatürk was essentially a realist. He repudiated adventurism and expansionism. What Turkey wanted was to accomplish its internal reconstruction in peace. The major stance of Atatürk's diplomacy was not only pacific, but was also clearly respectful of law. Since the Republic of Turkey came into existence, the main background of Turkish foreign policy had been friendship with the Soviets. Good relations with Russia guaranteed Turkey's continued security on its northeastern frontier and in the Black Sea. Following the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and basically on account of this fact a Turco-British rapprochement started to take shape since 1935. Close co-operation between Turkey and Britain during the Montreux Straits Conference further accelerated the pace. Another aspect of Turkish foreign policy was the Balkan Entente of 1934 to guard against aggression in the region. Turkey's part in the Saadabad Pact of 1937 had also been active and enthusiastic. Regaining of Turkish sovereignty over the Straits at the Montreux Conference and winning back of the district of Hatay were among the most important successes of the Turkish diplomacy under Atatürk's auspices.

Following his seizure of power in 1922, Mussolini began to pursue the policy of 'mare nostrum' of the ancient Romans. He had an eye on the Anatolian lands bordering the Mediterranean. Local symbol of the Italian menace was the Dodecanese Islands which were started to be fortified in 1934. Mussolini's speech of that year showed that Italy did not renounce its earlier designs on Turkish territory. Atatürk did not take Mussolini's claims seriously, but the danger Italy represented could not be ignored. During the Ethiopian crisis, Turkey supported the League of Nations' sanctions against Italy and advocated the principle of collective security. Facing Italian expansionism, Turkey requested the holding of an international conference in Montreux and succeeded to obtain the right of bringing back the Straits to full Turkish sovereignty. Turkey's distrust of Italy deepened in 1937 and 1938. Ankara disliked the policy of Rome-Berlin axis. It did not acquit Italy of designs in the eastern Mediterranean. Italian occupation of Albania in 1939 soon led to Turkey's signing of mutual assistance agreements with Britain and France. Italy sharply denounced the Turco-Anglo-French rapprochement. For Turkey, as an ally in the eastern Mediterranean, had the strength to tip the balance against Italy.