This article analyzes how the Ottoman ruling elite attempted to maintain their traditional policy of neutrality during the Hundred Days Crisis, which occurred between Napoleon Bonaparte’s escape from Elba and his second abdication following the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. During this volatile period, the Ottomans found themselves caught between the Allied powers, which demanded Ottoman alignment with the coalition formed against Napoleon, and Napoleon himself, who sent an envoy to the Porte to secure Ottoman recognition of his emperorship. Furthermore, the demonstrations and symbolic actions of Bonapartist French diplomats in the Ottoman capital and its periphery, such as displaying Bonaparte’s flag and wearing his imperial decorations and symbols on their clothing and diplomatic premises, led to diplomatic crises between the Ottomans and the French embassy, involving other diplomatic representations of the concerned European states. This article demonstrates that the Ottoman administration utilized its traditional policy of neutrality in European crises as a strategy to navigate these diplomatic incidents. Similar to the declaration of a republic in France after the Revolution (1792) and Napoleon’s assumption of the title of Emperor (1804), during the Hundred Days Crisis, the Ottoman administration initially adopted a wait-and-see approach and then emphasized neutrality to avoid entanglement in intra-European conflicts. Drawing on Ottoman archival documents and biographical works on Pierre Ruffin, the capable chargé d’affaires of the French Embassy, the article argues that the Ottoman policy of neutrality aimed to achieve two objectives: (1) refraining from antagonizing Bonaparte by maintaining diplomatic contact with the existing staff of the French embassy, and (2) preventing any incidents that could jeopardize Ottoman relations with the anti-Bonapartist coalition. Both objectives appeared to be met thanks to the skillful diplomatic handling of the incidents.

The status quo of Tunisia, that is, the nature of its relationship with the Ottoman centre emerged as a problem with the occupation of Algerian costs in 1830 and the centralisation of Tripoli in 1835. France frequently warned the Ottoman Empire not to subvert the status quo in Tunisia. Clarifying and internationally securing this formally undefined state of affairs had been the British policy in the region since the 1850s. Britain, especially with its consul, Richard Wood, endeavoured for a declaration of a firman stating that the Ottoman Empire recognised the inherited governorship of the Husaynid Dynasty and that the beys accepted the Sultan’s political suzerainty in Tunisia. This project, which was constantly delayed by the opposition of France, was realised in 1871. So the firman, which was expected to bring the region’s political position to wider international acceptance, was declared. This study aims to examine the debates about Tunisia’s status quo based on British and Ottoman archival sources. So, the efforts of the Ottoman Empire to protect the province, as well as the approaches and plans of Britain and France towards Tunisia, were explored.